Labor Law § 241(6) — The Industrial Code Battle

Section 241(6) is the middle ground in Labor Law defense. It's not absolute liability like § 240, and it's not ordinary negligence like § 200. It creates a non-delegable duty to provide "reasonable and adequate protection and safety" — but the plaintiff can only recover by identifying a specific, applicable regulation in the New York Industrial Code (12 NYCRR Part 23) that was violated. And unlike § 240, comparative negligence applies.

This means the defense has two bites: challenge the applicability of the cited regulation, and if that fails, reduce the verdict with comparative fault.

The Specificity Requirement — Where § 241(6) Cases Are Won on Paper

Not every Industrial Code provision supports a § 241(6) claim. The regulation must set forth a specific, positive command — not merely a general safety standard. After Ross v. Curtis-Palmer Hydro-Electric Co. (81 N.Y.2d 494), the Court of Appeals established that only regulations prescribing specific conduct qualify. General provisions that merely restate a duty of "reasonable care" are insufficient.

The practical effect: the defense's first task in every § 241(6) case is to pull the plaintiff's bill of particulars, identify every cited Industrial Code section, and research whether each one has been held sufficiently specific by the applicable Appellate Division. Some of the most commonly cited sections and their status:

• § 23-1.7(d) — Slipping hazards: "Employers shall not suffer or permit any employee to use a floor, passageway, walkway, scaffold, platform or other elevated working surface which is in a slippery condition." Held sufficiently specific to support a § 241(6) claim (Rizzuto v. L.A. Wenger Contracting Co., 91 N.Y.2d 343). But the defense can still argue the condition was not "slippery" within the meaning of the regulation — wet does not automatically mean slippery.
• § 23-1.7(e)(1) — Passageways: Requires passageways to be kept free of tripping hazards. Specific enough. But was the area where the plaintiff fell actually a "passageway" or simply an open work area? The distinction matters and is frequently litigated.
• § 23-1.7(e)(2) — Working areas: Requires working areas to be kept free of scattered tools and materials "insofar as may be consistent with the work being performed." The "insofar as consistent" qualifier gives the defense an argument that debris was inherent to the ongoing work.
• § 23-1.5(a) — General responsibility: General safety duty. Held insufficiently specific to support § 241(6). This is a freebie dismissal for the defense on any complaint that relies on it.
• § 23-1.21 — Ladders and ladderways: Contains multiple subparts, some specific, some not. Subsection (b)(1) requiring ladders to be "maintained in good condition" is too general. But subsection (b)(4)(ii) requiring specific safety feet on ladders has been held specific enough.
• § 23-2.1 — Maintenance of structural stability during construction: Generally held to be specific. Frequently cited in collapse cases.

Comparative Negligence in § 241(6)

Even if the plaintiff proves a viable Industrial Code violation, the defense can reduce the verdict through comparative fault. A worker who ignored safety signs, walked through a barricaded area, or failed to watch where they were stepping can have their recovery reduced — sometimes substantially. This is the defense argument that survives even when the statute applies. It requires the same careful deposition work as § 240 sole proximate cause: the plaintiff must be pinned down on what they saw, what they knew, and what they did immediately before the accident.